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I. Introduction 
In the past several decades, the principle of self-determination 
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has evolved and developed into a cardinal principle of international 
law.2  Recognized today generally as a jus cogens (peremptory) 
norm of international law,3 self-determination is generally viewed 
as including the right of “peoples” to express their identity as a 
sovereign nation.4  Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter 
elevates the principle of self-determination in international law, as 
one of the purposes of the United Nations is “to develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples.”5  There are generally two 
different types of self-determination: external and internal.  External 
self-determination has been explained by the United Nations 
General Assembly as the right of all peoples “freely to determine, 
without external interference, their political status and to pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.”6  Internal self-
determination has been defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Reference re Secession of Quebec (“Quebec Case”) as “a people’s 
pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development 
within the framework of an existing state.”7 
The contours of the principle of self-determination in 
international law have garnered much academic commentary.8  A 
 
 2 See LORI FISLER DAMROSCH, LOUIS HENKIN, SEAN D. MURPHY & HANS SMIT, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 324 (5th ed. 2009). 
 3 See Christian Leathley, Gibraltar’s Quest for Self-Determination: A Critique of 
Gibraltar’s New Constitution, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 153, 177 (2007) (“As a norm of jus 
cogens the right to self-determination has a status higher than any other in international 
law. It is a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a 
whole, from which no derogation is permitted and which can only be modified by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”). 
 4 Id. at 170. 
 5 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2. 
 6 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, at 123 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter United Nations G.A. Res 2625]. 
 7 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1371. 
 8 See, e.g., Milena Sterio, Self-Determination and Secession Under International 
Law: The New Framework, 21 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 293 (2015) (observing that most 
cases of external self-determination in the modern era occur outside of the context of 
decolonization or foreign occupation and arguing a new international law framework 
should be developed to apply to cases of modern-day secession in international law); Dr. 
Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession and the Criteria for Statehood in 
International Law, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1 (2015) (analyzing international legal principles 
in cases where secessionist groups use force to attempt to achieve self-determination); 
John R. Ablan, Note, Signal and Affirm: How the United Nations Should Articulate the 
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number of groups throughout the world have asserted claims of 
external self-determination.  For example, there have been 
movements for self-determination in South Sudan,9 East Timor,10 
 
Right to Remedial Secession, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 211 (2012) (advocating that 
secession in international law be recognized in cases where a resolution of the General 
Assembly recognizes the right in a particular case and the International Court of Justice 
has affirmed); Thomas W. Simon, Remedial Secession: What the Law Should Have Done, 
From Katanga to Kosovo, 40 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 105 (2011) (endorsing a remedial 
model of secession, which would recognize secession under international law generally in 
cases where methods of internal self-determination have failed); Hurst Hannum, 
Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (1993). 
 9 See, e.g., Jure Vidmar, South Sudan and the International Legal Framework 
Governing the Emergence and Delimitation of New States, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 541 (2012); 
Christopher Zambakari, Post-Referendum Sudan: The Nation-Building Project and its 
Challenges, 9 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 505 (2012); Salman M.A. Salman, South Sudan 
Road to Independence: Broken Promises and Lost Opportunities, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE 
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 343 (2013); Christopher Zambakari, Post-Referendum South 
Sudan: Political Violence, New Sudan, and Democratic Nation-Building, 18 GEO. PUB. 
POL’Y REV. 41 (2013). 
 10 See, e.g., Stephanie A. Paulk, Comment, Determination of Self in a Decolonized 
Territory: The Dutch, the Indonesians, and the East Timorese, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
267 (2001); Jonathan I. Charney, Self-Determination: Chechnya, Kosovo, and East Timor, 
34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 455 (2001); Roger S. Clark, Symposium, Recent 
Developments in East Timor: East Timor, Indonesia, and the International Community, 14 
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 75 (2000); Henry J. Richardson, A Critical Thought on Self 
Determination for East Timor and Kosovo, 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 101 (2000); 
Thomas D. Grant, East Timor, the U.N. System, and Enforcing Non-Recognition in 
International Law, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 273 (2000). 
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Western Sahara,11 Quebec,12 Kashmir,13 Kurdistan,14 Chechnya,15 
 
 11 See, e.g., Armin Steinbach, The Western Sahara Dispute: A Case for the ECJ?, 18 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 415 (2012); Laurence S. Hanauer, The Irrelevance of Self-
Determination Law to Ethno-National Conflict: A New Look at the Western Sahara Case, 
9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 133 (1995). 
 12 See, e.g., Stephen Alvstad, The Quebec Secession Issue, with an Emphasis on the 
“Cultural” Side of the Equation, 18 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 89 (2004); Johan D. Van 
Der Vyver, Self-Determination of the Peoples of Quebec Under International Law, 10 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (2000); L. Kinvin Wroth, Quebec, Canada and the First 
Nations: The Problem of Secession, 23 VT. L. REV. 709 (1999); Jean-Francois Gaudreault-
DesBiens, The Quebec Secession Reference and the Judicial Arbitration of Conflicting 
Narratives About Law, Democracy, and Identity, 23 VT. L. REV. 793 (1999); Roya M. 
Hanna, Comment, Right to Self-Determination in In Re Secession of Quebec, 23 MD. J.  
INT’L L. & TRADE 213 (1999); Kevin MacMillan, Comment, Secession Perspectives and 
the Independence of Quebec, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 333 (1999); Gregory Marchildon 
& Edward Maxwell, Quebec’s Right to Secession under Canadian and International Law, 
32 VA. J. INT’L L. 583 (1992). 
 13 See, e.g., Sikander Shah, An In-Depth Analysis of the Evolution of Self-
Determination under International Law and the Ensuing Impact on the Kashmiri Freedom 
Struggle, Past and Present, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 29 (2007); Brian Farrell, The Role of 
International Law in the Kashmir Conflict, 21 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 293 (2003). 
 14 See, e.g., Thomas D. Grant, Kurdistan After the Referendum of September 25, 
2017: Statehood, Recognition, and International Law, 46 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 369 
(2018); Craig Douglas Albert, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration No Place to Call 
Home: The Iraqi Kurds Under the Ba’ath, Saddam Hussein, and ISIS, 92 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 817 (2017); Matthew Packard, Note & Comment, Earning Independence in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, 27 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 177 (2013); Michael J. Kelly, The Kurdish 
Regional Constitution within the Framework of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A Struggle 
for Sovereignty, Oil, Ethnic Identity, and the Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause, 
114 PA. ST. L. REV. 707 (2010); Philip S. Hadji, Note, The Case for Kurdish Statehood in 
Iraq, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 513 (2009); Gregory J. Ewald, The Kurds’ Right to 
Secede Under International Law: Self-Determination Prevails Over Political 
Manipulation, 22 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 375 (1994). 
 15 See, e.g., Nicola Bunick, Note, Chechnya: Access Denied, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 985 
(2009); Cherylyn Brandt Ahrens, Note, Chechnya and the Right of Self-Determination, 42 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 575 (2004); Thomas D. Grant, A Panel of Experts for Chechnya: 
Purposes and Prospects in Light of International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 115 (1999). 
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Kosovo,16 Gibraltar,17 Catalonia,18 Crimea,19 and Somaliland20 in 
recent years.  Some of these movements, such as the movements in 
 
 16 See, e.g., Christopher R. Rossi, Impaled on Morton’s Fork: Kosovo, Crimea, and 
the Sui Generis Circumstance, 30 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 353 (2016); Timothy William 
Waters, Misplaced Boldness: The Avoidance of Substance in the International Court of 
Justice’s Kosovo Opinion, 23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 267 (2013); Samuel Ethan Meller, 
Note, The Kosovo Case: An Argument for a Remedial Declaration of Independence, 40 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 833 (2012); Milena Sterio, The Kosovar Declaration of 
Independence: “Botching the Balkans” or Respecting International Law?, 37 GA. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 267 (2009); Christopher J. Borgen, Symposium, Great Power Politics: The 
Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-
Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009); 
Ronald Thomas, Note, Transitional Justice: War Crimes Tribunals and Establishing the 
Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Countries: The Distinct Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia: 
Deciding the Questions of Independence on the Merits and International Law, 32 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1990 (2009); Jure Vidmar, International Legal Responses to 
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 779 (2009); K. 
William Watson, Comment, When in the Course of Human Events: Kosovo’s 
Independence and the Law of Secession, 17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 267 (2008); Daniel 
Fierstein, Note, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: An Incident Analysis of Legality, 
Policy and Future Implications, 26 B.U. INT’L L. J. 417 (2008). 
 17 See, e.g., Inge V. Porter, Two Case Studies in Self-Determination: The Rock and 
the Bailiwick, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 339 (2003). 
 18 See, e.g., Carmen Gonzalez, Note, The Catalan National Identity and Catalonia’s 
Bid for Independence, 32 CONN. J. INT’L L. 115 (2016); Christopher K. Connolly, 
Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and the European Union, 24 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 51 (2013); Dr. Pau Puig i Scotoni, Symposium, Exercising Self-
Determination Without Jeopardising the Rights of the Others: The Catalan Model, 14 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 395 (2001). 
 19 See, e.g., Thomas W. White, Jr., Referendum in Crimea: Developing International 
Law on “Territorial Realignment” Referendums, 38 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 843 (2016); Alisa 
Gdalina, Note, Crimea and the Right to Self-Determination: Questioning the Legality of 
Crimea’s Secession from Ukraine, 24 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 531 (2016); Stefan 
Kirchner, Crimea’s Declaration of Independence and the Subsequent Annexation by 
Russia Under International Law, 18 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 1 (2015); R.J. Delahunty, The 
Crimean Crisis, 9 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 125 (2014). 
 20 See, e.g., Dimitrios Lalos, Note, Between Statehood and Somalia: Reflections of 
Somaliland Statehood, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 789 (2011); Aaron Kreuter, 
Note, Self-Determination, Sovereignty, and the Failure of States: Somaliland and the Case 
for Justified Secession, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 363 (2010); Benjamin R. Farley, Comment, 
Calling a State a State: Somaliland and International Recognition, 24 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 777 (2010); Brad Poore, Somaliland: Shackled to a Failed State, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
117 (2009); Alison K. Eggers, Note, When is a State a State? The Case for Recognition of 
Somaliland, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 211 (2007). 
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South Sudan,21 Timor-Leste,22 and Montenegro,23 have resulted in 
the formation of sovereign nations which have received recognition 
as member states of the United Nations.24 
In recent years, a more visible movement for self-determination 
in Balochistan has emerged.  Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest 
province in terms of geographic size,25 is rich in natural resources 
such as gold, copper, coal, chromite, and natural gas.26  Between 
1948 and 1977, four different conflicts for Baloch independence 
were fought.27  Since the mid-2000s, an intermittent conflict 
between Baloch separatist groups and Pakistan has remained 
prevalent in Balochistan.28  Reportedly, a growing list of human 
rights abuses have occurred in Balochistan, including the killings of 
teachers, journalists, and activists, as well as kidnappings and forced 
disappearances.29 
This Article examines the question of self-determination for 
 
 21 See Jeffrey Gettleman, After Years of Struggle, South Sudan Becomes a New 
Nation, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/world/africa/10sudan.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q84C-6GE6]. 
 22 See East Timor wins independence, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2001), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/06/indonesia.easttimor 
[https://perma.cc/4GBF-K2FQ]. 
 23 See Predrag Milic, Montenegro Declares Its Independence From Serbia, WASH. 
POST (June 4, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/03/AR2006060300899.html [https://perma.cc/57R8-FA5U]. 
 24 See Member States, UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 15, 2019, 3:24 PM), 
https://www.un.org/en/member-states/ [https://perma.cc/6LP6-2RLJ]. 
 25 See Qasim Nauman, What is Pakistan’s Balochistan Insurgency and Why is 
India’s Modi Talking About It?, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2016, 6:38 AM), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2016/08/17/what-is-pakistans-balochistan-insurgency-and-
why-is-indias-modi-talking-about-it-the-short-answer/ [https://perma.cc/Z3KE-Z2D9]. 
 26 See Imdad Baloch, Balochistan: Rich in Natural Resources and Poor in Living 
Conditions, THE BALOCHISTAN POINT (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://thebalochistanpoint.com/balochistan-rich-in-natural-resources-and-poor-in-living-
conditions/ [https://perma.cc/3HST-9RZL]. 
 27 See Balochistan Insurgency, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (Sept. 7, 2018), 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/pakistan1.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6Y4K-NLW7]. 
 28 See Nauman, supra note 25. 
 29 See Husain Haqqani, Injustices in Balochistan Need the World’s Attention, THE 
WIRE (Sept. 24, 2017), https://thewire.in/external-affairs/balochistans-injustices-need-
worlds-attention [https://perma.cc/R4QH-MMZN]. 
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Balochistan.30  Part I briefly mentions several significant sources of 
international law that have enshrined self-determination as a 
fundamental principle of international law.  Part II discusses the 
history of Balochistan, its relationship with Pakistan, and human 
rights concerns in the region.  Part III analyzes the movement for 
self-determination in Balochistan and considers the possibility of a 
progressive and conservative coalition to work together toward self-
determination for Balochistan.  Finally, the Article concludes that 
the current situation in Balochistan offers an opportunity for both 
progressives and conservatives within the United States to work 
together to discuss the possibility of self-determination for 
Balochistan. 
II. Self-Determination in International Law 
Self-determination in international law was first embraced as a 
“principle” of international law31 in Article 1(2) of the United 
Nations Charter, which recognizes the “self-determination of 
peoples.”32  Subsequent key international documents have enshrined 
this principle.  The United Nations General Assembly also strongly 
endorsed self-determination in a 1970 resolution where it stated that 
the “principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
constitutes a significant contribution to contemporary international 
law, and that its effective application is of paramount importance 
for the promotion of friendly relations among States, based on 
respect for the principle of sovereign equality.”33  This resolution 
additionally requires states to refrain from any “forcible action” 
which interferes with the right of self-determination and also 
provides that “subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation constitutes a violation” of the principle 
of self-determination.34 
Other international instruments have similarly affirmed the right 
to self-determination.  Article 1(1) of the International Covenant on 
 
 30 See Maryam S. Khan, Ethnic Federalism in Pakistan: Federal Design, 
Construction of Ethno-Linguistic Identity & Group Conflict, 30 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC 
JUST. 77 (2014); Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and 
Enduring Failures of International Law: The Unending Wars Along the Afghanistan-
Pakistan Frontier, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010). 
 31 DAMROSCH, supra note 2, at 324. 
 32 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2. 
 33 United Nations G.A. Res 2625, supra note 6, at 122.  
 34 Id. at 122–23. 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides that all peoples have 
the right to “freely determine their political status,” as well as to 
“freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”35 
As international law has developed, the right of self-
determination has become fully recognized in two types of cases: 
the first type of case is where a colonial peoples seeks the right to 
self-determination, and the other is in cases of foreign occupation 
or subjugation.36  The case of secession, which encompasses the 
aims of most self-determination movements today, is unsettled in 
international law.37 
Both the Supreme Court of Canada and the International Court 
of Justice (“ICJ”) have examined the question of secession under 
international legal principles.  In 1998, the Supreme Court of 
Canada addressed the question of whether the government of 
Quebec could secede from Canada unilaterally under principles of 
international law in the Quebec Case.38  While the Supreme Court 
of Canada answered the question in the negative,39 it addressed the 
definition of “peoples” for purposes of self-determination40 and 
mentioned another instance where secession would be permissible 
under international law.41  The Supreme Court of Canada noted that, 
while the precise definition of “people” is uncertain,42 the sharing of 
a common language and culture would be characteristics considered 
in determining whether a group was a “people.”43  Finally, the 
Supreme Court of Canada also remarked that in cases where a 
people is denied their right to internal self-determination, the people 
is entitled to secession as a “last resort.”44  In essence, this would 
take place in cases where a people “is denied meaningful access to 
 
 35 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1(1). See also International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 1(1) 
(endorsing the right of self-determination). 
 36 See Valerie Epps, Secession, Stagnation and the State-Centered Version of 
International Law, 21 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307, 309–11 (2015). 
 37 Id. at 309–13. 
 38 See Reference re Secession of Quebec, 37 I.L.M. at 1342. 
 39 Id. at 1376. 
 40 Id. at 1370–71. 
 41 Id. at 1373. 
 42 Id. at 1370. 
 43 Id. at 1371. 
 44 See Reference re Secession of Quebec, 37 I.L.M. at 1372–73. 
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government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural 
development.”45 
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its 
independence from Serbia.46  In 2010, in an advisory opinion, the 
ICJ decided that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence 
from Serbia did not violate international law because “general 
international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations 
of independence.”47  However, the ICJ did not address the question 
of whether international law afforded Kosovo a positive right to 
declare independence.48  Thus, the ICJ avoided further addressing 
the larger question in international law as to when a people may 
have a general right to declare independence.49  Two commentators, 
Roland Tricot and Barrie Sander, have observed that the message of 
the ICJ in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion was that disputes over 
declarations of independence “should be left to the international 
community to decide through political fora.”50 
While the precise limitations of self-determination are unsettled 
in international law, it is clear that another fundamental principle of 
international law is respect for the territorial integrity of a state.51  
The principle of territorial integrity appears prominently in Article 
2(4) of the United Nations Charter, as the Charter calls for all 
member states to “refrain in their international relations from the 
 
 45 Id. at 1373. 
 46 See Dan Bilefsky, Kosovo Declares its Independence from Serbia, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 18, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/world/europe/18kosovo.html 
[https://perma.cc/8FKQ-DFRD]. 
 47 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 84 (July 22) [hereinafter 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion]. 
 48 Id. ¶ 56. 
 49 See generally Richard Falk, Agora: The ICJ’s Kosovo Advisory Opinion: The 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion: Conflict Resolution and Precedent, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 50 
(2011) (arguing the “[c]ourt behaved in a somewhat political manner, deferring to 
geopolitical wishes by rather unexpectedly validating the Kosovo declaration, yet seeking 
to prevent wider policy effects, which seemed to avoid a simple textual application of the 
intentions of the Security Council as set forth in Resolution 1244”). 
 50 Roland Tricot & Barrie Sander, Recent Developments: The Broader Consequences 
of the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 321, 362 (2011). 
 51 See Paul C. Szasz, The Irresistible Force of Self-Determination Meets the 
Impregnable Fortress of Territorial Integrity: A Cautionary Fairy Tale about Clashes in 
Kosovo and Elsewhere, 28 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (1999). 
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threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state[.]”52  Both the principle of self-
determination and respect for the territorial integrity of states must 
be balanced in international law.53  The case of self-determination 
for Balochistan is one such issue that must be balanced between 
both principles. 
III. Balochistan 
A. A Brief History of Balochistan 
Today, Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest geographical 
province.54  Two academic commentators have noted that the 
Baloch have historically been comprised of a number of ethnic 
groups, including peoples of African origin, Arabs, Persians, Turks, 
Kurds, Dravidians, and Sewais (Hindu).55  Culturally, the Baloch 
people are generally regarded as more secular and moderate.56  The 
majority of the population speaks Balochi, although a significant 
number of individuals in Balochistan speak Pashto.57  The 
population of Balochistan is primarily rural58 and approximately 
two-thirds of the 12 million people59 live outside of urban areas.60 
From 1839 to 1947, Kalat was a semi-autonomous state.61  
 
 52 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 53 See generally Szasz, supra note 51 (citing the Decolonization Resolution of the 
UN General Assembly proclaimed that all people “have the right to self-determination . . . 
[and] any attempt aimed of the disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity 
of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 54 Malik Siraj Akbar, In Balochistan, Dying Hopes for Peace, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/opinion/pakistan-elections-balochistan-
islamic-state.html [https://perma.cc/D8D3-3J9T]. 
 55 Manzoor Ahmed & Gulawar Khan, The History of Baloch and Balochistan: A 
Critical Appraisal, 32 S. ASIAN STUD. 1, 4 (2017). 
 56 Baluchistan: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Oversight and Investigations of the 
Com. on Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 7 (2012) [hereinafter Baluchistan Hearings] 
(statement of U.S. Rep. Brad Sherman of Cal.). 
 57 Id. at 71 (statement of Ali Dayan Hasan, Pakistan Director, Human Rights Watch). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Haqqani, supra note 29. 
 60 Baluchistan Hearings, supra note 56, at 71 (statement of Ali Dayan Hasan, 
Pakistan Director, Human Rights Watch). 
 61 Id. See also Brian Spooner, The British period, 1839-1947, BALOCHI LINGUIST 
(Apr. 7, 2011), https://balochilinguist.wordpress.com/2011/04/07/the-british-period-
1839-1947/ [https://perma.cc/X7DT-ER2Z] (“From 1839 to 1947 the greater part of 
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While Mir Chakar Khan Rind, a Baloch chieftain, formed a 
confederacy of Baloch tribes in the 1480s, the founding of the 
Baloch nation is generally viewed as emerging with Mir Ahmed 
Khan’s formation of the Kalat Confederacy in the 1660s.62  The 
Khan of Kalat thus had authority over Balochistan until the arrival 
of the British in 1839.63  In 1947, the vast majority of tribal chiefs 
in Balochistan yielded their territory “to the new state of Pakistan.”64  
That same year, the Khan of Kalat declared independence.65  
However, the Pakistani military crushed the insurgency after 
approximately eight months.66  Thus, Balochistan was partitioned 
and eventually Balochistan officially became a province of Pakistan 
in 1970.67  Since 1947, five distinct conflicts for independence have 
erupted in Balochistan: conflicts have occurred in 1948, from 1958 
to 1959, from 1963 to 1969, from 1973 to 1977, and from 2004 to 
the present.68  The conflict between 1973 and 1977 was a 
particularly brutal one, where some areas of Balochistan were 
bombed at random.69  By estimates, over 6,000 Baloch and 3,300 
Pakistani soldiers were killed in this conflict.70  Since 2004, a civil 
war has gripped Balochistan.71 
B. Relationship between Balochistan and Pakistan 
Balochistan is regarded as the most impoverished province in 
Pakistan.72  According to a 2016 report on multidimensional poverty 
 
Baluchistan was – formally or informally – under the British Empire, whose interest was 
essentially in securing and protecting its North-West Frontier Province from both 
Afghanistan and Iran. At a particular stage in this endeavor the British negotiated formal 
international borders through the territories of Baluch tribes with both Iran and 
Afghanistan, roughly according to the effective sphere of influence of the khan of Kalat, 
but with some attention to the interests of local leaders.”). 
 62 Ahmed & Khan, supra note 55, at 5. 
 63 Id. at 7. 
 64 See MARY ANNE WEAVER, PAKISTAN: DEEP INSIDE THE WORLD’S MOST 
FRIGHTENING STATE 94 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux rev. ed. 2010). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Ahmed & Khan, supra note 55, at 7. 
 68 Balochistan Insurgency, supra note 27. 
 69 WEAVER, supra note 64, at 95. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Balochistan Insurgency, supra note 27. 
 72 Baluchistan Hearings, supra note 56, at 4 (opening statement of U.S. Rep. Dana 
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in Pakistan, approximately 71 percent of the population of 
Balochistan were living in multidimensional poverty.73  The current 
literacy rate in Balochistan is 41 percent.74 
Despite widespread poverty in Balochistan, Balochistan 
contains an abundance of natural resources such as gold, coal, 
copper, and uranium,75 as well as a large supply of natural gas.76  
However, a significant number of districts in the Balochistan 
province lack access to natural gas.77 
In recent years, Balochistan’s major port, Gwadar, has been 
developed with substantial Chinese investment to become a major 
center of trade along the Strait of Hormuz.78  The China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (“CPEC”), an approximately $62 billion 
alliance between Pakistan and China, has greatly increased China’s 
influence in Balochistan.79 
Pakistan has aggressively opposed and suppressed efforts for 
Baloch self-determination.  Additionally, Pakistan has allegedly 
supported targeted assassinations and kidnappings in the current 
conflict.80  During the ongoing conflict with Baloch nationalists, 
 
Rohrabacher of Cal.). 
 73 See Adnan Aamir, 71 Percent People in Balochistan Live Below Poverty Line: 
Report, BALOCHISTAN VOICES, 1 (June 20, 2016), 
http://balochistanvoices.com/2016/06/71-percent-people-balochistan-live-poverty-line-
report/ [https://perma.cc/4VUP-5H3N]. 
 74 See Fajar Nadeem, Illiteracy in Balochistan, VOICE OF BALOCHISTAN (Feb. 28, 
2018), https://voiceofbalochistan.pk/opinions-and-articles/social-development/illiteracy-
in-balochistan/ [https://perma.cc/H36E-SBSW]. 
 75 Baluchistan Hearings, supra note 56, at 4 (opening statement of United States 
Rep. Dana Rohrabacher of Cal.). 
 76 See Syed Fazl-E-Haider, Oil & Gas Future in Balochistan: More Exploration 
Activities Required, PAK. & GULF ECONOMIST (Jan. 22, 2018), 
http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/2018/01/22/oil-gas-future-balochistan-exploration-
activities-required/ [https://perma.cc/Q6Y5-2GGW]. 
 77 See Saleem Shahid, Gas supply demanded in all Districts of Balochistan, DAWN 
(Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.dawn.com/news/1354660 [https://perma.cc/A6T4-3BKR]. 
 78 Baluchistan Hearings, supra note 56, at 4 (opening statement of U.S. Rep. Dana 
Rohrabacher of Cal.). 
 79 See Patrick Wintour, ‘All-weather friendship’: but is Pakistan Relying too heavily 
on China?, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/aug/03/all-weather-friendship-but-is-pakistan-
relying-too-heavily-on-china [https://perma.cc/G778-687D]. 
 80 See FREDERIC GRARE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, 
BALOCHISTAN: THE STATE VERSUS THE NATION 4 (Apr. 2013) (“The Pakistani military has 
so far proven unable to eliminate militant organizations and the larger nationalist 
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Pakistan has gone so far as to reportedly back religious militants 
who are fighting the Baloch.81  This appears to be part of a general 
strategy, as one commentator notes, of an “Islamization” of the 
province.82  Pakistan has also suppressed Baloch cultural identity – 
for example, the Balochi language is not taught in local schools in 
Balochistan.83  These efforts, and the growing influence of China in 
Balochistan, are viewed by some as a conscious effort of Pakistan 
to convert the Baloch into a minority in Balochistan.84 
C. Human Rights Concerns in Balochistan 
The violence in Balochistan has also been acknowledged by the 
United States Department of State, which urges United States 
citizens to refrain from travel to Balochistan, citing violence 
resulting from the separatist movement and terrorism.85  Professor 
 
movement, despite conducting targeted assassination campaigns and kidnappings.”). 
 81 See James M. Dorsey, The US-Saudi Plot for Iran that Spells Trouble for China’s 
new Silk Road, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 27, 2017, 4:00 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2095734/us-saudi-plot-iran-spells-
trouble-chinas-new-silk-road [https://perma.cc/43UH-VPXB] (“Balochistan has long been 
troubled by a low level nationalist insurgency. To counter this, Pakistan has backed 
religious militants.”). 
 82 See GRARE, supra note 80, at 4 (“It was the state’s repressive response that 
radicalized most elements of the ‘nationalist’ movement . . . . The Pakistani security 
establishment . . . has been unable to impose its writ on the province, much less propose 
viable alternative structures. Meanwhile, the security establishment has exacerbated ethnic 
tensions . . . . [A]nd allegedly, the security establishment has lost control of its radical 
proxy groups. The attempted Islamization of the province has led to less, not greater, 
control for the central government, and a hotbed of extremism is developing in a part of 
the population where it was previously unknown.”). 
 83 See Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, Baloch children don’t learn Balochi in schools, but 
set to be taught Chinese, THE ECON. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/baloch-children-
dont-learn-balochi-in-schools-but-set-to-be-taught-chinese/articleshow/66062348.cms 
[https://perma.cc/YBY7-KJNH] (describing an order to teach Chinese to schoolchildren in 
Gwadar, even as the Balochi language is not taught). 
 84 See Hassan Hamdam, Self-Determination and the Baloch National Question, 
BALOCHISTAN TIMES (July 10, 2017),                                                                       
[https://perma.cc/4QBP-YHAA] (“[T]hese states [Pakistan in particular] are systemically 
implementing a policy of bringing about demographic changes thus converting the Baloch 
into a minority in their motherland.”). 
 85 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Pakistan Travel Advisory, 
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV (Aug. 1, 2018),  
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/pakistan-travel-
advisory.html [https://perma.cc/6TWN-EDGD] (“Active terrorist groups, an active 
separatist movement, sectarian conflicts, and deadly terrorist attacks against civilians, 
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Christine Fair of Georgetown University has testified that the 
human rights record in Balochistan is “appalling.”86  Acts of terror 
continue to occur in Balochistan, and political activists, journalists, 
and teachers are often targets of violence.87 
Since the beginning of the most recent conflict – since around 
2004 – human rights organizations have reported numerous 
instances of torture, excessive use of force, disappearances, and 
displacement of civilians.88  The United States Department of State 
reported that nearly 200 civilians were killed due to terrorism-
related violence in 2017.89  While the Pakistani security forces have 
been accused of many human rights violations, militant Baloch 
nationalist groups have also been accused of human rights 
violations during the current conflict.90  In early July 2019, the 
United States Department of State placed the Balochistan Liberation 
Army,91 a militant Baloch nationalist group, on its Specially 
Designated Global Terrorist list.92  The Balochistan Liberation 
Army has reportedly “undermined the hold of the traditional tribal 
chiefs over the Baloch society” (who have also generally supported 
Baloch independence) and the organization has been banned in 
 
government offices, and security forces destabilize the province, including all major 
cities.”). 
 86 Id. at 10 (testimony of statement of Assistant Professor Christine Fair, PhD., 
Georgetown University). 
 87 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., Pakistan 2017 Human 
Rights Report, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE FOR 2017 3 (2017). 
 88 See Baluchistan Hearings, supra note 56, at 74 (statement of Ali Dayan Hasan) 
(“Pakistani human rights organizations have recorded numerous human rights violations 
by security forces, including extrajudicial executions, torture, enforced disappearances, 
forced displacement, and excessive use of force.”). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 75 (statement of Ali Dayan Hasan) (“Armed militant groups in Balochistan 
are responsible for targeted killings and destroying property . . . . Militant nationalists 
groups . . . have claimed responsibility for most killings of non-Baloch civilians, including 
teachers and other education personnel.”). 
 91 See generally Kallol Bhattacherjee, Explained: The Baloch Liberation Army, THE 
HINDU  (July 3, 2019), https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/explained-the-
baloch-liberation-army/article28273960.ece [https://perma.cc/MY7Y-VWZK] 
(describing the size, history, leadership, and goals of the Baloch Liberation Army). 
 92 Geeta Mohan & Hamza Ameer, US adds Balochistan Liberation Army to terrorism 
list, INDIA TODAY (July 3, 2019), https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/us-adds-
balochistan-liberation-army-to-terrorism-list-1560794-2019-07-03 
[https://perma.cc/4WM5-6MCH]. 
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Pakistan since 2006.93 
Widespread extrajudicial killings are also prevalent in 
Balochistan.  Security forces have targeted political activists and 
suspected Baloch separatists.94  Between 2011 and 2016, 
approximately 1,000 extrajudicial killings occurred.95  These 
incidents are often “kill and dump” actions, where security forces 
abduct and kill an individual, and then abandon the body.96  The 
presence of widespread human rights abuses throughout 
Balochistan, and the potential of Baloch independence to ameliorate 
them, is one of the arguments commonly cited by proponents of 
self-determination for Balochistan. 
IV. The Movement Toward Self-Determination for 
Balochistan 
A. Baloch Nationalist Movement 
The origins of Baloch nationalism began with the arrival of the 
British in Balochistan in 1839.97  As Professors Gulawar Khan and 
Manzoor Ahmed have remarked, the ensuing decades of Baloch 
nationalism were marked by “assimilation and political 
pragmatism.”98  The partition of 1947 can be viewed as the birth of 
modern Baloch nationalism.99 
 
 93 Bhattacherjee, supra note 91, at 10. 
 94 See Balochistan war: Pakistan accused over 1,000 dumped bodies, BBC (Dec. 28, 
2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38454483 [https://perma.cc/4LUK-
QQYG] (“[M]ost of the bodies ‘are of those activists who have been victims of “enforced 
disappearances” - people who are picked up by authorities and then just go missing.’ His 
allegations chime with an independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) 
report in 2013 that noted ‘credible reports of continued serious human rights violations, 
including [enforced] disappearances of people, arbitrary arrests, torture and extrajudicial 
killings.’”). 
 95 Id. 
 96 See Baluchistan Hearings, supra note 56, at 81 (statement of Ali Dayan Hasan) 
(“[S]ince January 2011, at least 300 people have been abducted and killed and their bodies 
abandoned—acts widely referred to as ‘kill and dump’ operations, in which Pakistani 
security forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations may be responsible.”). 
 97 AHMED & KHAN, supra note 55, at 48. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See WEAVER, supra note 64, at 94 (“Then came the Partition in 1947 . . . [t]here 
was immediate chaos in Balochistan. The nawabs and sardars insisted on their right to 
independence . . . the khan, to the annoyance of the British and the bewilderment of 
Pakistan, declared independence. It lasted only eight months, the Pakistani Army moved 
in and crushed the insurrection, and the Baloch were transformed . . . they became 
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The Baloch national movement today is not fully united.100  
There are both political movements and militant groups within the 
movement.101  A cause of more recent division in the movement is 
the response to the Pakistani government’s 2009 reforms for 
Balochistan, Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan (“Beginning of Rights 
in Balochistan”).102  These reforms delegate more authority to 
Balochistan’s provincial government, require the Pakistani 
government to obtain provincial consent for major projects, and call 
for “increasing Baloch employment in the civil service, giving 
provincial and local government authorities a greater share of 
resource industry revenues, and compensating communities 
displaced by violence.”103  These reforms have been appealing to the 
more moderate Baloch.104  Today, there is a continuing division 
within the Baloch people: those who seek a system in which the 
Baloch people have greater autonomy within the existing state of 
Pakistan and those who support outright independence.105 
B. The Efforts of Peter Tatchell 
The cause of self-determination for Balochistan has been 
buoyed in the international arena by the advocacy of human rights 
 
nationalists.”). 
 100 Balochistan: A road map for peace & self-determination, PETER TATCHELL 
FOUND. (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.petertatchellfoundation.org/balochistan-a-road-map-
for-peace-self-determination/ [https://perma.cc/LLR5-LZAS]. 
 101 Id. 
102  See “We Can Torture, Kill, or Keep You for Years” – Enforced Disappearances 
by Pakistan Security Forces in Balochistan, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 28, 2011), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/07/28/we-can-torture-kill-or-keep-you-years/enforced-
disappearances-pakistan-security [https://perma.cc/XBG2-235F] (“These reforms 
notwithstanding, doubts persist within Baloch society about the Pakistan government’s 
intentions. Significant Baloch nationalist parties and leaders have rejected the package, 
claiming it does not adequately address core grievances or genuinely enable greater 
provincial autonomy . . . . However, Baloch nationalists are highly splintered, and it is 
unclear how much influence Baloch political leaders now exert over militant groups.”). 
 103 Id. at 12. 
 104 See ANATOL LIEVEN, PAKISTAN: A HARD COUNTRY 343 (Public Affairs 2011) 
(describing how reforms were not “nearly enough” for Baloch nationalists, but were 
appealing to moderate Baloch). 
 105 See Balochistan: A road map for peace & self-determination, supra note 100 
(“The first major challenge is that the Baloch democratic national movement needs to find 
a way to become more united . . . . Right now, we have a great deal of disunity with many 
different political parties and guerrilla movements, sometimes with competing sectarian 
agendas and political rivalries.”). 
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activist Peter Tatchell,106 a widely-regarded British human rights 
advocate, progressive, and member of the Green Party.107  Tatchell 
founded the Peter Tatchell Foundation, which “seeks to promote 
and protect the human rights of individuals, communities, and 
nations, in the UK and internationally, in accordance with 
established national and international human rights law.”108  
Tatchell has been involved in many successful self-determination 
movements, including in Zimbabwe, Angola, South Africa, and 
Timor-Leste.109 
From 2010 to 2013, Tatchell and a group of Baloch national 
activists worked together on a draft road map for peace and self-
determination for Balochistan.110  In a February 2013 address before 
a conference of the Unrepresented Nations & Peoples 
Organization,111 Tatchell outlined a six-point road map for peace 
and self-determination, a draft “Baloch Freedom Charter,” to serve 
as a “starting point for a united front for Baloch emancipation.”112  
These six-points include the following: 
1. Ceasefire in Balochistan and a halt to all military operations 
by all sides; 
 
 106 Id. 
 107 See Peter Tatchell, THE GUARDIAN (2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/profile/petertatchell  [perma.cc/B35E-6ZEC]. 
 108 See About Us, PETER TATCHELL FOUND., 
http://www.petertatchellfoundation.org/about/ [perma.cc/G58L-EGT6]. 
 109 See Balochistan: A road map for peace & self-determination, supra note 100, at 
3–4. 
 110 Id. at 2. 
 111 See About UNPO, UNREPRESENTED NATIONS & PEOPLES ORG., 
https://unpo.org/section/2 [https://perma.cc/VV9X-RZP5] (“UNPO was conceived of in 
the 1980s by exiled leaders of people living under communist oppression, Linnart Mäll of 
the Congress of Estonia, Erkin Alptekin of the Uyghur people, and Lodi Gyari of Tibet, 
along with Michael Van Walt van Praag, the international law advisor of the 14th Dalai 
Lama. A key goal was to replicate the powerful message of nonviolence in the face of 
oppression exhibited by the Tibetan people and championed by the 14th Dalai Lama. The 
UNPO was formally founded in 1991 at the Peace Palace in The Hague, by representatives 
of movements belonging to Australian Aboriginals, Armenia, Crimean Tatars, Cordillera, 
East Timor, East Turkestan, Estonia, Georgia, the Greek Minority in Albania, Kurdistan, 
Latvia, Palau, Tibet, Taiwan, Tatarstan and West Papua. Since then, UNPO’s membership 
has also grown steadily from its original fifteen founders, representing now more than 40 
Members worldwide, with many former members have achieved their movement’s goals 
and found a formal seat for their people at the national or international level.”). 
 112 See Balochistan: A road map for peace & self-determination, supra note 100, at 
3. 
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2. Release of all political prisoners and accounting for all 
disappeared persons; 
3. Allowing the news media, aid agencies, and human rights 
organizations access to Balochistan; 
4. Allowing displaced refugees to return to Balochistan, their 
properties restored, and compensation received for all losses 
sustained by the conflict; 
5. The ending of the “population transfer” of non-Baloch 
settlers into Balochistan; and 
6. Allowing a UN-supervised referendum on the question of 
Baloch self-determination to occur.113 
In his remarks, Tatchell noted that the movement for self-
determination for Balochistan faces three major challenges.  First, 
Tatchell made a call for unity within the Baloch national movement 
to create a united national front.114  Tatchell also observed that the 
Baloch movement had very little participation by women and that 
the success of the movement requires the empowerment of 
women.115  Finally, it was also an obstacle to self-determination that 
no comprehensive peace and self-determination plan had been 
developed.116  The Baloch Freedom Charter was intended to be a 
starting point to unite all the Baloch political parties around 
commonly agreed key principles.117 
Four years later, in May 2017, Tatchell spoke on Balochistan 
again before the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium at a 
conference hosted by the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization.118  In addition to reemphasizing the six key points of 
the Balochistan Freedom Charter announced in 2013, Tatchell 
added the following six principles, which could serve as 
fundamental principles of an independent Balochistan: 
1. Social justice, equality, and human rights for all people in 
Balochistan; 
 
 113 Id. at 2–3. 
 114 Id. at 4. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 6. 
 118 See Balochistan – 60 years of Pakistani occupation; Six steps to halt the conflict, 
protect human rights & secure self-rule, PETER TATCHELL (May 10, 2017), 
http://www.petertatchell.net/international/baluchistan/balochistan-a-road-map-for-peace-
self-determination/ [perma.cc/M4PN-TUEQ]. 
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2. Land reform; 
3. Redistribution of wealth in Balochistan; 
4. A secular state; 
5. Democratic freedoms, free multi-party elections, the 
freedom of speech and press, and the protection of the right to 
protest; and 
6. The establishment of a UN Commission of Inquiry to 
investigate cases of disappeared persons and victims of torture, 
extrajudicial killings, and cases of detention without trial.  In 
addition, the establishment of a UN Special Tribunal for 
Balochistan to investigate potential crimes against humanity, as 
well as war crimes.119 
Tatchell has continued to vigorously advocate for Baloch self-
determination.  In November 2017, he was a strong supporter of the 
World Baloch Organization’s effort to place messages on buses in 
London, such as “Free Balochistan,” “Save the Baloch People,” and 
“Stop Enforced Disappearances,” to raise awareness of 
Balochistan.120 
C. The United States Congress and H. Con. Res. 104 
No member of Congress has appeared to have advocated more 
for Balochistan’s self-determination than Republican Congressman 
Dana Rohrabacher of California.  Balochistan garnered increased 
congressional attention in early 2012 with a hearing called by 
Congressman Rohrabacher before the Oversight and Investigations 
Subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives 
Foreign Affairs Committee.121  In his opening statement, 
Congressman Rohrabacher alleged that the Pakistani government 
had, to that point, “refused to concede any legitimacy to Baluch 
nationalism or to engage the Baluch leadership in serious 
negotiations” and that the Pakistani government’s response to 
Baluch nationalism had “been based on brute force, including 
extrajudicial killings.”122  The Subcommittee received testimony 
 
 119 Id. 
 120 See Press Trust of India, ‘Free Balochistan’ Ads Appear on London Buses, NDTV 
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/free-balochistan-ads-appear-on-
london-buses-1775479 [perma.cc/49PR-54AK]. 
 121 See Baluchistan Hearings, supra note 56, at 1 (opening statement of United States 
Representative Dana Rohrabacher of California). 
 122 Id. at 2. 
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from several witnesses, three of whom testified to the numerous 
human rights abuses occurring in Balochistan.123 
Several days following the February 8, 2012 congressional 
hearing on Balochistan, Congressman Rohrabacher introduced H. 
Con. Res. 104 on February 17, 2012 in the United States House of 
Representatives, which would express the belief of Congress that 
Balochistan has the right to self-determination.124  The resolution 
referred to a “plunder of [Balochistan’s] vast natural wealth” and 
noted that “it is the policy of the United States to oppose aggression 
and the violation of human rights inherent in the subjugation of 
national groups as currently being shown in Iran and Pakistan 
against the aspirations of the Baluch people.”125  Finally, the 
resolution concluded that the people of Balochistan “have the right 
to self-determination and to their own sovereign country and they 
should be afforded the opportunity to choose their own status among 
the community of nations, and to live in peace and harmony, 
without external coercion.”126  The legislation was co-sponsored by 
two of the most conservative members of the United States House 
of Representatives, Congressman Louie Gohmert of Texas127 and 
Congressman Steve King of Iowa.128 
While the legislation was introduced in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, and referred to the Subcommittee on Middle East 
and South Asia of the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign 
Affairs Committee, it never made it out of the Subcommittee.129  No 
 
 123 See Baluchistan Hearings, supra note 56, at III (referencing statements by Dr. 
Hossein Bor, Professor Christine Fair, Ali Dayan Hasan, and T. Kumar). 
 124 See H.R. Con. Res. 104, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 See Jay Root, Courting Controversy Works for Gohmert, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/us/louie-gohmert-texas-republican-
notorious-yet-popular.html [https://perma.cc/S27K-UGMD] (describing Gohmert’s 
conservative views on the Constitution, rulings as a judge, and controversies as a 
Congressman that have garnered praise from very conservative constituents). 
 128 See Dave Price, Why Steve King Keeps Winning, POLITICO (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/why-steve-king-keeps-winning-
214913 [https://perma.cc/VMC5-J7B6]. 
 129 See See H.R. Con. Res. 104, 112th Cong. (2012). (describing the historical 
oppression of Baluchistan and reaffirming their right to self-determination); see also 
H.Con.Res.104 - Expressing the Sense of Congress That The People of Baluchistan, 
Currently Divided Between Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, Have The Right To Self-
Determination And To Their Own Sovereign Country, CONGRESS.GOV (2012), 
2020 BALOCHISTAN, SELF-DETERMINATION & U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 215 
companion legislation was ever introduced in the Senate, and in 
subsequent Congresses (113th Congress, 114th Congress, and 115th 
Congress), the measure has not been reintroduced. 
Several members of the United States House of Representatives 
have expressed support for Balochistan’s self-determination in 
speeches on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives in recent 
Congresses.  Congressman Rohrabacher has expressed support in 
remarks on September 21, 2012,130 and Congressman Gohmert 
expressed support in remarks on February 27, 2012131 and January 
29, 2014.132  During the February 8, 2012 congressional hearing, 
Republican Congressman Ted Poe of Texas also mentioned his 
support for self-determination.133 
The conservative members of Congress who have supported 
Balochistan’s self-determination expressed a number of reasons.  
While human rights in Balochistan has been cited by Congressman 
Rohrabacher,134 as well as Congressman Gohmert,135 geopolitical 
concerns in the region have also been cited to support an 
independent Balochistan.  Congressman Gohmert noted reports that 
supplies to the Taliban in Afghanistan were being transported 
through Balochistan from Pakistan.136  Congressman Gohmert also 
noted that an independent Balochistan may help cut off supplies to 
 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/104/text 
[https://perma.cc/JS3V-LQAR] (documenting the status and life of the bill). 
 130 158 CONG. REC. E1628 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2012) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher).  
 131 See 158 CONG. REC. H964 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2012) (statement of Rep. Gohmert) 
(“[P]erhaps it is time to recognize an independent Baluchistan, where we’d have a friend 
who would not keep supplying the enemy of America . . . empower the enemy of our 
enemy, the Northern Alliance and the Baluch people. Let them take care of their own 
area.”). 
 132 160 CONG. REC. H1506 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2014) (statement of Rep. Gohmert).  
 133 See Baluchistan Hearings, supra note 56, at 93 (referencing the remarks of United 
States Representative Ted Poe of Texas). 
 134 Id. at 1 (opening statement of United States Representative Dana Rohrabacher of 
California). 
 135 See id. at 93 (referencing the remarks of United States Representative Louie 
Gohmert of Texas) (“It is greatly disturbing to hear that weapons that we have provided to 
Pakistan have been utilized to create human rights’ violations. That is particularly 
disturbing. That is not what this Nation is about.”). 
 136 See 160 CONG. REC. H1506 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2014) (statement of Rep. Gohmert) 
(“[M]ost of the supplies to the Taliban are coming from Pakistan through the southern 
Baloch area of Pakistan, and maybe if Balochistan was independent of Pakistan, that would 
cut off the supply to the terrorist Taliban.”). 
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the Taliban.137  Eddie Walsh, a senior foreign correspondent, has 
observed that Congressmen Rohrabacher and Gohmert generally 
support an alternative foreign policy approach in southwest Asia by 
advocating for the interests of the National Front of Afghanistan in 
Afghanistan138 and the Baloch in Balochistan over the sovereign 
interests of Afghanistan and Pakistan.139  In essence, the argument 
is that an independent Balochistan would serve United States 
foreign policy interests in the ongoing conflict with the Taliban that 
has lasted approximately seventeen years.140  Walsh has also noted 
that the congressional effort for self-determination for Balochistan 
is linked with sentiment critical of Pakistan, and that another strong 
rationale for support could be that an independent Balochistan 
would place a check on China’s influence with the Gwadar port and 
Iran’s influence in the Strait of Hormuz.141 
D. U.S. Foreign Policy and Balochistan 
The United States Department of State has expressed concerns 
over human rights abuses in Balochistan.  In its most recent report 
 
 137 Id. 
 138 See Eddie Walsh, Should the US support an independent Balochistan?, AL 
JAZEERA (Mar. 3, 2012), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/02/201222112203196390.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZD8V-FZUF] (“This alternative policy centers on backing remnants of 
the Northern Alliance and Baloch insurgents”); TOM LANSFORD, AFGHANISTAN AT WAR: 
FROM THE 18TH CENTURY DURRANI DYNASTY TO THE 21ST CENTURY 310–11 (Tom 
Lansford ed., ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2017) (giving a brief overview and history of the National 
Front of Afghanistan). 
 139 See Walsh, supra note 138 (“Rohrabacher . . . and Representative Steve King . . . 
introduce[ed] a new bill in Congress stating that the Baloch nation has a historic right to 
self-determination . . . advancing a revolutionary alternative policy approach that called 
for supporting the minority interests of the Northern Alliance and Baloch against the 
sovereign interests of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.”). 
 140 See Ryan Browne, 17 years in, Afghan war at a ‘stalemate,’ CNN (Nov. 27, 2018, 
7:11 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/27/politics/us-afghan-war-stalemate/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/PKR3-LTLB] (“It’s not entirely static but for the most part it’s a 
stalemate.”). 
 141 See Walsh, supra note 138 (“When one discusses Balochistan, you are discussing 
a way to contain China . . . . This is of strategic interest to the United States because 
Chinese ships would have a direct route to China and no longer have to transit past the 
Indian and American navies . . . . Iran is an empire and they are using Baloch lands to try 
to become the dominant regional player. The Iranians are using the Strait of Hormuz as a 
choke-point for a huge percentage of the world’s oil. They also are building a pipeline to 
Pakistan which violates UN sanctions. Such growing Iran-Pakistan cooperation is a major 
concern.”). 
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on human rights in Pakistan in 2017, the Department of State noted 
that there were numerous reports of arbitrary or unlawful killings 
and abductions in Balochistan.142  This same report also stated that 
journalists, teachers, students, and human rights activists were 
targeted in Balochistan.143 
Although there are numerous human rights abuses in 
Balochistan, the United States government has remained adamant 
in its opposition to self-determination for Balochistan.  The topic of 
self-determination for Balochistan was addressed specifically in a 
September 2016 news briefing at the United States Department of 
State.144  In that briefing, State Department spokesman Admiral 
John Kirby expressly mentioned that the policy of the United States 
was to support the territorial integrity of Pakistan and oppose 
independence for Balochistan.145  While this statement was made 
during the Obama Administration, as of this date, the Trump 
Administration has not expressed any major change in United States 
foreign policy with regard to self-determination for Balochistan. 
E. International Law, Self-Determination and Balochistan 
With the advocacy of Baloch nationalists, including Peter 
Tatchell, and several members of Congress, the question of self-
determination for Balochistan remains a prominent issue in 
international law.  In the wake of the Quebec Case and the Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion, there are several robust arguments to be made 
for Baloch self-determination given the history of Balochistan, the 
current human rights situation in the region, and Pakistan’s 
relationship with Balochistan. 
 
 
 142 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., supra note 87, at 2, 
4, 18 (referencing numerous reports of authorities committing arbitrary or unlawful 
killings, disappearances, and abductions of human rights advocates by security forces in 
connection with the conflict in Balochistan). 
 143 Id. at 4, 5, 18. 
 144 See News Desk, Islamabad slams Delhi’s bid to raise Balochistan issue at UN, 
THE EXPRESS TRIB. (Sept. 16, 2016), https://tribune.com.pk/story/1182346/islamabad-
slams-delhis-bid-raise-balochistan-issue/ [https://perma.cc/3AYL-M42Y] (“When asked 
whether the US tolerates those working from US soil to break the province off from 
Pakistan, [State Department Spokesperson] Kirby reiterated his statement that Washington 
does not support any such movement.”). 
 145 Id. 
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1. Self-Determination as a Remedial Right Due to 
Human Rights Violations 
Under the remedial right theory of secession,146 there is 
purportedly a right to secede in cases where other rights have been 
violated.147  This right would arise in certain situations, including 
where there are “large-scale and constant violations of basic human 
rights.”148  Several academic commentators have remarked “that the 
human rights situation in Balochistan is fairly grave [and] cannot be 
denied by any impartial observer.”149  While the remedial right 
theory provides a strong moral justification for the right to self-
determination,150  it should be noted that the theory has a major 
shortcoming in that it has not been fully established as a principle 
in international law. 
However, with the widespread targeting of human rights 
 
 146 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 8, at 143 (2011) (“The Remedial Model goes beyond 
proposing merely a liberty right to secede, which focuses on whether the right should be 
permitted. Instead, the Remedial Model invokes a stronger, moral right to secede, which, 
unlike a liberty right, places obligations on others not to interfere with the secession 
process.”); see also id. at 145 (“Secession rights are remedial rights invoked by a group 
under limited conditions to rectify harms; they are not rights that apply to all citizens in 
general.”). The origin of the remedial theory is from philosopher Allen Buchanan. See 
Allen Buchanan, Self-Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law, THE MORALITY OF 
NATIONALISM 301–323 (Robert McKim & Jeff McMahan, eds., 1997) (“The approach I 
began to develop there construes the right to secede as a remedial right . . . as a remedy of 
last resort for serious injustices.”). For further discussion of the remedial theory, see also 
Steven R. Fisher, Towards “Never Again”: Searching for a Right to Remedial Secession 
Under Extant International Law, 22 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 266 (2015-2016) 
(“Secession for this purpose, correcting human rights violations, has been termed remedial 
secession . . . and will be the specific focus of this Article.”); Lea Brilmayer, Secession 
and the Two Types of Territorial Claims, 21 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 325, 326–27 (2015) 
(providing a brief definition of the remedial theory and how it differs from a competing 
theory); Meller, supra note 16, at 846–47 (2012) (illustrating remedial succession and 
some issues it has faced as a theory). 
 147 See KARMANYE THADANI, MOHAMMAD IRFAN SOHAIL & DEVENDER DHYANI, THE 
RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF PAKISTAN’S BALOCH: CAN BALOCHISTAN GO THE 
KOSOVO WAY? 40 (Lambert Academic Publishing 2013) (“Remedial rights theories 
analogize the right to secede to the right to revolution, understanding it as a right that a 
group comes to have only as a result of violations of other rights . . . The right to unilateral 
secession thus derivate upon the violation of other, more basic rights.”). 
 148 Id. at 41. 
 149 Id. at 47. 
 150 See Simon, supra note 8, at 143 (“The Remedial Model goes beyond proposing 
merely a liberty right to secede . . . the Remedial Model invokes a stronger, moral right to 
secede.”). 
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activists and political activists in Balochistan, and extensive 
documented instances of extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and 
torture,151 the moral argument for self-determination for Balochistan 
to promote and uphold human rights is a salient one.  Perhaps 
Balochistan’s strongest argument for self-determination is the 
positive impact that independence could have on the protection of 
human rights.  It is significant that the United States Department of 
State, which has followed a policy of opposing self-determination 
for Balochistan, has acknowledged that there is a “culture of 
impunity” among perpetrators of human rights abuses in 
Balochistan and that a “lack of accountability” exists in 
Balochistan.152  Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, the 
same 2017 report on human rights practices in Pakistan notes that a 
“culture of lawlessness” exists in Balochistan.153  As a remedial 
measure, self-determination arguably has a very strong rationale in 
situations not only where large scale and widespread human rights 
violations occur, but where they are coupled by a lack of 
accountability as well.  Arguably, Balochistan falls within this 
category, and an independent Balochistan with governance by the 
Balochi people may reduce the severity of the human rights 
violations in the region that have allegedly occurred by both the 
Pakistani security forces, as well as militant Baloch nationalists. 
Within the past several years, there has been a disturbing 
development in that the Islamic State (“ISIS”)154 has appeared to 
increase its attacks in Balochistan.155  In July 2018, Siraj Raisani, a 
prominent Pakistani politician, was assassinated in a suicide 
bombing in Balochistan prior to the 2018 elections in Pakistan.156  
 
 151 See generally, Baluchistan Hearings, supra note 56. 
 152 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., supra note 87, at 1 
(“There was a lack of government accountability, and abuses often went unpunished, 
fostering a culture of impunity among the perpetrators, whether official or unofficial.”). 
 153 Id. at 2. 
 154 See generally Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/  
[https://perma.cc/8HXU-T5UT]. 
 155 See Akbar, supra note 54. 
 156 Memphis Barker, Nawaz Sharif arrested on arrival in Pakistan as 132 people die 
in bombing, THE GUARDIAN (July 13, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/13/suicide-bomb-attack-kills-85-and-
wounds-100-at-mastung-pakistan-election-rally [https://perma.cc/9FXW-Q833]. 
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ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack.157  Malik Siraj Akbar, a 
journalist, contends that Pakistan’s strategy in recent years of 
utilizing more extreme Islamist groups to battle Baloch separatists 
has led to a situation where ISIS militants have emerged to 
destabilize the region and Pakistan.158  Akbar further opined that the 
Pakistani military appears to “be deluded that they can use and 
control these groups.”159  An independent Balochistan, strengthened 
by independence and external support, can stand as a bulwark 
against ISIS to better protect the human rights of the Baloch people. 
2. Self-Determination as a “Last Resort” Due to Lack of 
Meaningful Access to Government 
As indicated in the Quebec Case, a right to secession exists in 
cases where a people are denied their right to internal self-
determination and “meaningful access to government.”160  As the 
Supreme Court of Canada noted in the Quebec Case, the sharing of 
a common language and culture are two significant characteristics 
which are common among a “people” for purposes of international 
law.161  With the case of Balochistan, as discussed above, there is a 
unique Balochi language and the Baloch people have a longstanding 
unique cultural history.  Thus, the Baloch people arguably qualify 
as a “people” for purposes of international law. 
A strong argument for Baloch self-determination is that the 
population of Balochistan is arbitrarily and capriciously being 
denied a fair distribution of the province’s resources, particularly 
with the CPEC alliance.  As Congressman Ted Poe remarked in 
2012, “[t]he Baluch people have the resources to take care of 
themselves, but the government of Pakistan takes the resources and 
either puts tight constraints on the profit that goes back to the 
Baluchs or gives the profit away to its friends.”162  With regard to 
gas, Congressman Poe stated the Balochistan province only 
received $0.29 per thousand cubic feet for gas, as compared to the 
Punjab province, which received $2.35 per thousand cubic feet, and 
 
 157 Id. 
 158 See Akbar, supra note 54. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Reference re Secession of Quebec, 37 I.L.M. at 1342, 1373. 
 161 Id. at 1371. 
 162 158 CONG. REC. E649 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2012) (statement of Rep. Poe). 
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the Sindh province, which received $1.65 per thousand cubic feet.163  
The CPEC is also a major concern to the Baloch, as Pakistan and 
China are set to receive a major financial windfall from the 
corridor.164  The province of Balochistan is set only to receive 0.5 
percent of the profits from CPEC.165  Of revenues which will arise 
from the Gwadar port, 91 percent are contracted to go to the Chinese 
government, 9 percent to the Pakistani government, and nothing to 
the Balochistan provincial government.166 
The “meaningful access to government” part of the Quebec 
Case’s test for internal self-determination requires an inquiry to 
determine whether a people can obtain representation in 
governmental institutions.167  Pakistan has two parliamentary 
bodies, the National Assembly of Pakistan and the Senate.168  The 
National Assembly is the more powerful of the two houses.169  
Balochistan has only seventeen seats out of 342 seats in the National 
Assembly,170 which provides Baloch interests a minimal voice in 
Pakistan’s parliamentary process.171 
In the Quebec Case, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that it 
could not be plausibly denied that the people of Quebec had access 
to government.172  The Supreme Court of Canada stated: 
Quebecers occupy prominent positions within the government of 
 
 163 Id. 
 164 Akbar Shahid Ahmed, China and Pakistan Plan to Get Rich Together. The Price? 
Human Rights., HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2018, 4:15 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-pakistan-balochistan-gwadar-plan-human-
rights_us_5b560d39e4b0fd5c73c7c122 [https://perma.cc/T8F2-RMA8]. 
 165 Shazar Shafqat, CPEC and the Baloch Insurgency, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 8, 2017), 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/cpec-and-the-baloch-insurgency/ 
[https://perma.cc/N9UV-NQTQ]. 
 166 Adnan Aamir, Pakistan’s CPEC Projects Leaving Balochistan Behind, ASIA 
TIMES (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.asiatimes.com/2018/04/opinion/balochistan-is-being-
left-behind-by-cpec/ [https://perma.cc/S9RQ-N8PE]. 
 167 See Reference re Secession of Quebec, 37 I.L.M. at 1342, 1373. 
 168 Baluchistan Hearings, supra note 56, at 20 (noting statement of Assistant 
Professor Christine Fair, PhD., Georgetown University). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id.; see Composition, NAT’L ASSEMBLY OF PAK. 
http://www.na.gov.pk/en/composition.php [https://perma.cc/VWV2-QSAD]. 
171 But see Government has bypassed all roads and bypass plans in Balochistan, 
ASIANET PAK. (Sept. 13, 2019), https://asianetpakistan.com/general/402684/government-
has-bypassed-all-roads-and-bypass-plans-in-balochistan/ [https://perma.cc/7SEX-2FLF]. 
 172 Reference re Secession of Quebec, 37 I.L.M. at 1342, 1373. 
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Canada. Residents of the province freely make political choices 
and pursue economic, social and cultural development within 
Quebec, across Canada, and throughout the world. The population 
of Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive, and 
judicial institutions.  In short, to reflect the phraseology of the 
international documents that address the right to self-
determination of peoples, Canada is a “sovereign and independent 
state conducting itself in compliance with the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the 
territory without distinction.”173 
In contrast to the Quebec Case, the Baloch people have very 
limited representation in Pakistan’s government and are receiving 
limited government benefits.174  In fact, Balochistan is arguably 
“denied the use of its own resources.”175 
The essential exclusion of Balochistan from any proceeds of the 
Gwadar port, miniscule financial interest in the CPEC alliance, and 
severely limited representation in Pakistan’s parliament creates a 
compelling argument that the current situation in Balochistan meets 
the Quebec Case’s definition of a people being denied internal 
means of self-determination due to a lack of meaningful access to 
government. 
F. An Opportunity for Conservative and Progressive 
Bipartisan Support for Self-Determination for 
Balochistan? 
The advocacy for Balochistan’s self-determination of 
progressive human rights campaigner Peter Tatchell and some of 
the most conservative members of the United States Congress opens 
up the possibility of an opportunity for a bipartisan coalition to 
develop.  Walsh has remarked that the issue of human rights in 
Balochistan may be a “powerful advocacy tool” to support the 
movement for self-determination.176  Support for increased 
protections for human rights in Balochistan may perhaps be the 
most compelling argument for self-determination, and it likely will 
 
 173 Id. 
 174 Baluchistan Hearings, supra note 56, at 20 (statement of Assistant Professor 
Christine Fair, PhD., Georgetown University). 
 175 Id. at 17. 
 176 Walsh, supra note 138. 
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have broad-based appeal to both conservatives and progressives. 
However, Balochistan’s strongest ally in Congress, Dana 
Rohrabacher, was defeated in the 2018 midterm congressional 
elections.177  Congressman Ted Poe, who also took interest in 
Balochistan, retired.178  The absence of Rohrabacher’s presence in 
the 116th Congress will be difficult for the visibility of the 
movement to support self-determination in Balochistan.  Yet, two 
outspoken advocates for self-determination, Republicans Louie 
Gohmert179 and Steve King,180 are returning to the 116th Congress.  
Democratic Congressman Brian Higgins, who has not specifically 
endorsed self-determination for Balochistan but has shown some 
interest in the movement, is returning to the 116th Congress.181  In 
February 2013, Congressman Higgins attended a forum sponsored 
by the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization on the 
future of Balochistan at the Royal Society in London.182  However, 
 
 177 Devan Cole, California Democrat Harley Rouda defeats longtime Rep. Dana 
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he was not a co-sponsor of H. Con. Res. 104.183 
As the 116th Congress is underway, the issue of self-
determination for Balochistan is one that both conservatives and 
progressives can examine together to work toward the promotion of 
human rights.  Despite the partisanship in Washington, vocal 
advocacy for human rights crosses party lines.  The 2012 
congressional hearing on Balochistan conveyed that the Republican 
and Democratic members of Congress who spoke during the 
hearing mentioned human rights concerns.184  Although outside of 
the United States, the advocacy work of the Green Party’s Peter 
Tatchell shows that progressives, as well as conservatives, can both 
be vocal in support of Balochistan.185  In fact, Tatchell, an ardent 
progressive, and Congressman Rohrabacher, an ardent 
conservative, spoke at the same forum on Balochistan sponsored by 
the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization in 2013.186  
The common ground in promoting human rights and the dignity and 
worth of every individual provides an opportunity for both 
Republicans and Democrats, conservatives as well as liberals, to 
work together on Balochistan and to at least address the issue of 
improving human rights in the region and the various arguments 
concerning self-determination in policy debates. 
In recent months, Balochistan has continued to receive 
international media attention. Protests in London have drawn 
attention to the alleged abduction of women and children by the 
Pakistani military187 and protests in Quetta have been held against 
enforced disappearances.188  The issue of self-determination is not 
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completely lost in recent policy discussions.189 
V. Conclusion 
With the 2020 elections approaching, the political atmosphere 
within the United States remains highly polarized.190  In the realm 
of foreign policy, immigration and migration from Mexico and 
other countries garner much attention from policymakers.191  
Unfortunately, the situation in Balochistan generally does not 
receive as much attention, despite the presence of several robust 
arguments under international legal principles to support self-
determination for Balochistan. 
With the 2020 presidential campaign underway, bipartisanship 
in the United States Congress may be difficult to generate.  
However, U.S. policy with regards to Balochistan is an area where 
both conservatives and progressives can align together and place 
politics aside to promote human rights and the dignity and worth of 
every human being.  By engaging in policy debates concerning the 
possibility of self-determination for Balochistan, conservatives and 
progressives can work together to promote human rights in 




ZERD] (last visited Oct. 26, 2019). 
 189 Saket Suman, Watching ‘Bard of Blood’ & ‘Family Man’? Here’s a Background 
Of The Problem in Balochistan, INDIA TIMES (Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://www.indiatimes.com/news/world/watching-bard-of-blood-family-man-here-s-a-
background-of-the-problem-in-balochistan-376744.html [https://perma.cc/VG3N-L5KN] 
(last accessed Oct. 26, 2019). 
 190 Jason Puhr, Michigan State University study shows polarized politics at worst 
levels in U.S. history, WWMT (Nov. 6, 2018), https://wwmt.com/news/local/study-shows-
polarized-politics-at-its-worst-in-us-history [https://perma.cc/C7MX-Z6HF]. 
 191 See, e.g., Kevin Breuninger & Tucker Higgins, Trump Unveils hard-line 
immigration policy that limits asylum, CNBC (Nov. 9, 2018, 9:56 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/08/trump-unveils-hard-line-immigration-policy-that-
limits-asylum.html [https://perma.cc/KXJ8-ABXJ]. 
226 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLV 
 
